“It is Musical?”: Nietzschean Aesthetics

In this exercise I will be examining the development of Nietzsche’s thought around topic of aesthetics. The texts that will be discussed are *The Birth of Tragedy*, “An Attempt at Self-Criticism,” *Ecce Homo* and *Twilight of the Idols.* The questions I will address are simple: Does the mature Nietzsche believe in the Apolline/Dionysian duality? What does he find most insightful and problematic about *The Birth of Tragedy*? I will demonstrate that the young Nietzsche’s aesthetic principles regarding the Apolline and Dionysian drives are inconsistent. I will show that there is a tension between the two drive doctrine of artistic creation and the ontology of these drives. I will then move to Nietzsche’s later work and articulate how his thought reflects a resolution to this inconsistency. I will argue that Nietzsche dropped to two drive conceptualization in favor on one artistic drive: the Dionysian.

In *The Birth of Tragedy*, the young Nietzsche claims that the creation of art depends on the opposition between two organic artistic drives: the Apolline and the Dionysian. These competing drives provide for the development of three distinct types of artist: the Apolline artist whose paradigmatic case is the sculptor, the Dionysian artist who is epitomized in the musician, and the tragic artist, particularly in the instance of Aeschylus, who represents the harmonious synthesis of the two artistic drives.

The Apolline and Dionysian drives, however, are not just organic human drives, but rather representations of the drives inherent in nature writ large. Nietzsche claims that these powers “erupt from nature itself, without the mediation of any human artist.”

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*The following citations refer to the work, section and page number of the text referenced. Editions of the referred texts are listed at the end of the exercise.

1 *The Birth of Tragedy*, Section 2, p 19
nature, itself, overflows and creates without the necessary need for humans to express these powers. Rather, the relationship between the artist and nature is that of imitator and imitated. Humans are part of nature as they are one of its creations. Therefore, humans can be considered a semblance of nature. Furthermore, being part of nature, the Apolline and Dionysian drives reside in the human body thereby providing conditions for the possibility of access to the deep ground of nature. Humans, then, in experiencing their artistic drives are able to create an appearance of the deep ground of existence. Accordingly, a semblance of nature (the human being) creates further semblances of nature. The artist, in an unmediated state (being entirely overcome by the Dionysian or Apolline drive), becomes unified with nature thereby channeling its surplus creative power. Overcome and overfull from the creative powers of nature, the artistic agent seeks to discharge provoking the person to imitate this experience of unity with nature in plastic, auditory or performance art.

What underlies Nietzsche’s understanding of the artistic creation is that the artist is given over to and in oneness with the primordial unity of becoming. One loses their ego, their “I,” in the artistic process. Therefore, for Nietzsche, a good artist is not a subjective artist because a subjective artist is not released from their thinking, cognitive capacities and given over to the primordial unity.² As such, what distinguishes the Apolline and Dionysian drives is the degree of semblance that separates their artistic creations from the primordial unity.

The Apolline and Dionysian drives correlate, for Nietzsche, to the distinct art worlds of dream and intoxication. The purely Apolline artist’s world of art correlates to dream worlds. The Apolline dream artist pays close attention to the details of his or her dreams in order to put forth artistic creations. Although dreams may seem real and are experienced with a great degree of pleasure, the Apolline artist always understands that dreams are only forms of semblance.

² *The Birth of Tragedy*, Section 5, 29
Nevertheless, in this mode of artistic creation, it is as if the artist is shining a light on what is inherently obscured and contradictory in the primordial unity thereby revealing beautiful transcendent truth. In focusing on the beautiful and orderly, the Apolline artistic drive engenders a sense of measure or limits. Apolline artistic drive moves the artistic agent to distinguish and neatly order their art in such a way as to clearly convey their dream experience. Thus, the Apolline instinct is the root of the *principium individuationis* (the principle of individuation). Finally, and most importantly, the Apolline artist is making semblances of semblances (dreams), and does so as a *distant observer*.

The Dionysian artist, on the other hand, is the antipode of the Apolline dream artist. The Dionysian art world is that of intoxication. Nietzsche states: “These Dionysiac stirrings, which, as they grow in intensity, cause subjectivity to vanish to the point of complete self-forgetting.”

The Dionysian artist is overcome by this drive losing their sense of individual self as if they are under the influence of drugs. In the Dionysian state the agent recognizes their self as being deeply and inextricably unified with other human beings and nature. This feeling and experience, then, is of the primordial unity of continuous becoming.

Nietzsche states that the “Dionysiac musician, with no images at all, is nothing but primal pain and the primal echo of it.” Thus the creations of the Dionysian artist are not images of semblances but direct auditory and physical semblance of the primordial unity. The Dionysian becomes an immediate conduit for nature to exude its overflowing power, and music and dance, accordingly, are semblances of nature itself.

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3 Ibid, Section 1, 17
4 Ibid, 18
5 Ibid, Section 5, 30
Already there are conceptual problems with this dual drive thesis. Both the Apolline and Dionysian seem to resemble forms of intoxication in that both drives provide for the agent to lose their self, their ego. However, Nietzsche claims that intoxication is a uniquely Dionysian feature. Furthermore, it seems that the Apolline comes out of the Dionysian, as Nietzsche example of Raphael’s Transfiguration details. He states that at the bottom of the painting “the frightened, helpless disciples, shows us a reflection of the eternal, primal pain, here ‘semblance’ is a reflection of the eternal contradiction, the father of all things.”6 Out of the root of the eternal contradiction comes the Apolline “vision-like new world of semblance.”7 If it is the case that the Apolline is rooted in the Dionysian, is not the Dionysian drive the sole artistic drive? Is not the Dionysian ontologically prior to and the condition for the possibility of Apolline semblances? Above all, is the Dionysian the ground for all art?

I believe this problem is best highlighted in Nietzsche’s discussion of the instinctual difference between the Apolline epic poet Homer, and the Dionysian lyric poet Archilochus. In order to better understand the lyric poet and the creation poetic composition in general, Nietzsche employs Schiller’s claim that when he writes poetry it is not images and signs that engender poetry, but rather the images emerge from what he describes as a “musical mood.”8 The music precedes the images thereby conceptualizing music as ontologically prior to other forms of art, and as producing other forms of art. What Nietzsche does not immediately recognize is that both Homer and Archilochus are poets meaning that the “musical mood” applies to both artists. Although Homer’s poetic images seems to reflect a distant Apolline artist, his poetry is rooted in Dionysian rumblings. Consequently, both Homer and Archilochus are instantiations of the Dionysian artistic drive. The epic and lyric are not distinct types of artists

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6 Ibid, Section 4, 26, emphasis added
7 Ibid, 26
8 Schiller from BT Section 5, 29-30
who differ in the composition and discharge of their organic drives, but rather they are the same for type of artist (Dionysian) whose distinction lies in the form of semblance that each creates. These differing forms of imitation then, reflect how the agent perceives and interprets the primordial unity. Nietzsche states: “In the first instance the lyric poet, a Dionysian artist, has become entirely at one with the primordial unity as music, which has been described elsewhere, quite regularly, as a repetition of the world and a second copy of it; now, however, under the Apolline dream, this music in turn becomes visible to him as in a symbolic dream-image.”

Nietzsche also attempts to extend the distinction between Homer and Archilochus (the Apolline/Dionysian duality) to the language of the Ancient Greeks. For Nietzsche, these poets represent “two main currents in the linguistic history of the Greek people, depending on whether language imitated the world of appearances and imagery or the world of music.” In context of his aesthetics, Nietzsche is making a distinction without difference. Yes, Homer and Archilochus may differ greatly in what they imitate. However, their grammar is still rooted in the deep musical ground of nature. Archilochus and Homer are both poets and as such their compositions are to be sung. Nietzsche states: “music refers symbolically to the original contradiction and original pain at the heart of the primordial unity, and thus symbolizes a sphere which lies above and beyond all appearance.” Music is the semblance of the primordial unity (becoming) that we are all a part of. The quintessence of music is unending becoming. Accordingly, music is both unending and opened-ended as becoming is always in excess; it is surplus. What the imagery of poetry imitates is either music of nature or the images are engendered by music. Music is the root of all artistic representations. These other artistic creations, therefore, are the horizon of the spirit of music. Furthermore, whatever meanings or

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9 Ibid, Section 5, 30
10 Ibid, Section 6, 34
11 Ibid, 36
signifiers that imitate music or stem from it, cannot represent or fully articulate the deep ground of the primordial unity. Nietzsche states: “Music, itself, in its absolute sovereignty, has no need at all for images and concepts but merely tolerates them as an accompaniment.”

It seems then that the drives don’t compete to produce art, but rather the deep ground of nature provides for an ontology of artistic creation whose ground is music.

This linguistic distinction seems to better serve as an illumination of the difference between poetic Greeks and Socratic Greeks that Nietzsche makes later in his treatise. This difference calls into the question the importance of the opposition between the Apolline and Dionysian drives. For Nietzsche, the development of tragedy reached its apex with the synthesis of the Dionysian and Apolline drives in the work of Aeschylus. The high Attic tragedy thus reflected most deeply the universal, the primordial unity. Being rooted in Dionysian rumblings, the tragedy drew the spectator in through the music and dance of the chorus. The audience would experience the loss of their personal self (the ego, “I”) while feeling the greater oneness with both nature and other human beings. The decline of tragedy, however, is reflected how Euripides put the average spectator at the front and center of the drama thus making art imitate human life instead of imitating nature. In other words, Euripides was a semblance who created semblances of semblances. In comparison to the Dionysian and Apolline artist Euripides is furthest removed from the truth of the primordial unity of becoming. Nietzsche views Euripides as leveling dramatic art to the basest common denominator: mass, popular understanding. Although some may claim that Euripides did well in helping the masses understand the dramatic arts, in framing artistic creation in this light, he looks to appease the masses rather than release or discharge his artistic drives. This attitude disengages the artistic drives.

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12 Ibid, 36
13 Ibid, Section 11, 55
14 Ibid, 57
process and bases the development of art on the taste of the masses. Moreover, in getting the masses to understand the drama, Euripides thoughtfully focused on the underlying logic and structure of the narrative. Euripides ‘artistic’ maxim is: “In order to be beautiful, everything must be reasonable.”\(^{15}\) Nietzsche interprets Euripides as disengaging his poetic spirit in favor of his logical, rational faculties and making them ultimate judge of art. Nietzsche claims that the person who inspired Euripides “the thinker”\(^{16}\) was Socrates.

Euripides “the thinker” took to analyzing the older tragedies of Sophocles and Aeschylus and found that the works lacked logical coherence and clarity. Rather, Euripides “perceived something incommensurable in every feature and every line, a certain deceiving definiteness, and at the same time a puzzling depth, indeed infinity, in the background.”\(^{17}\) In taking the distant position of the thinker, Euripides’ cogitations could not comprehend and clearly articulate the deep ground which the older tragedies were in unison with and revealed. Nietzsche believes that Euripides eviscerated the tragic art form by rooting out the Dionysian content.\(^{18}\) As such, Euripides dissolves the Apolline/Dionysian synthesis inherent in high tragedy by purging the strange, irrational and unclear Dionysian elements in favor of Socratism. The problem that Euripides and Socrates represent is the duality of the Dionysus (the irrational and profoundly dark and deep) and Socrates (the logical, clear thinker). It is not a problem between the Apolline and Dionysian drives. It may seem that Socrates is an instantiation of the Apolline drive. Socratism, however, does not have the feature of being overcome and losing oneself in the artistic process. Nietzsche states: “There is not a trace left here of that \textit{epic} condition of losing oneself in semblance.”\(^{19}\) In this statement, Nietzsche again reveals his inconsistency with regard

\(^{15}\) Ibid, Section 12, 62
\(^{16}\) Ibid, Section 11, 58
\(^{17}\) Ibid, 58
\(^{18}\) Ibid, Section 12, 59
\(^{19}\) Ibid, 61, emphasis added
to the drives. Although the epic Apolline drive the creative position of observer, it does so in the midst of being overcome and losing oneself. As such, the Apolline is here characterized as a form of intoxication. Regardless, Socratism is the true antithesis of artistic drive(s). In Euripides creating drama from the Socratic perspective he inverts the artistic process. His drama is grounded in individual, rational thought and so does not arise out of the oneness with primal contradiction of becoming. In other words, the Socratic works of Euripides actively work to expurgate the very drive that gives rise to true artistic creation.

Furthermore, Socratism denigrates the organic drives, including the artistic ones, by claiming that instinct is problematic. Knowledge does not stem from instinct and action, but rather from critical, thoughtful reflection on concepts. This sets the body as secondary and ancillary to the higher truth contemplative knowledge. Moreover, this is the paradigm for the modern day “theoretical man.” Socrates’ type is interpreted by Nietzsche as taking a counterstance toward nature that calls into question the value of the life as the primal contradiction is understood by Socrates as a problem to be fixed. As such, Socrates is the paradigm of anti-nature: through a lack of creative artistic instinct, the dominant instinct becomes critical. Nietzsche finds that Socrates is unspiritual in that his lack of artistic drives does not provide him a portal to the primordial unity. Moreover, Socrates was unable to turn his critical faculties on itself because he was driven by his so-called daemon or rather his instinct! Thus, even Socrates seemed to have an awareness of his contradictory state but did not have the mystic poetic language to articulate this. That is, Socrates was unmusical and thus represents a different, anti-Dionysian, un-poetic linguistics. One does not sing Socratic arguments, but rather utters them. Nietzsche states: “The optimistic dialectic drives music out of tragedy under the

20 Ibid, Section 15, 72
21 Ibid, Section 13, 66
22 Ibid, 66
lash of its syllogism; i.e. it destroys the essence of tragedy which can only be interpreted as a manifestation and transformation into images of Dionysian states, as the visible symbolization of music, as the dream-world of Dionysian intoxication."23 It is of note here that Nietzsche’s statement further illuminates the inconsistency of the dual drive thesis as the intoxication is taken as a type of dream-world. Nevertheless, the linguistic history of the Greeks does not seem to hedge so much on the difference between Homer and Archilochus, but rather on the difference in the deeply poetic language of the older tragic Greeks and the airy prosaic language of modern Socratic Greeks.

Although Nietzsche is inconsistent in his understanding of the artistic drives and seems to call into question the general importance of the thesis in regard to the history and development of Greek art and culture, it is not enough to take *The Birth of Tragedy* as his final word on aesthetics. Rather, this would overlook Nietzsche’s later thoughts on the creation of art and on the book itself. In “An Attempt at Self-Criticism” and *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche makes several critical claims about his earlier book: He states that the book is “badly written, clumsy, embarrassing.”24 Moreover, he also regrets that he did have the words to express his message, but instead used “Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulations, things which fundamentally run counter to both the spirit and taste of Kant and Schopenhauer.”25 Moreover, he finds the work distasteful in its implicit Hegelianism: “One ‘idea’—the opposition between Dionysian and Apollinian – translated into metaphysics; history itself the development of this ‘idea’; the opposition sublated into unity in tragedy.”26 He also finds that the book’s creation nihilistic as is not rooted in the Dionysian or Apolline drives. However, its only life affirming quality is the

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23 Ibid, Section 14, 70
24 “An Attempt at Self-Criticism,” Section 2, p 5
25 Ibid, Section 6, p 10
26 *Ecce Homo*, “The Birth of Tragedy,” Section 1, 108
very development of the Dionysian concept. Finally, Nietzsche believes that he should have
expressed himself differently in representing these ideas as he “ought to have sung, this ‘new
soul’, and not talked!”

On the other hand, Nietzsche finds that his book begins to articulate some worthwhile
insights regarding the problem of science (Wissenschaft). He states that what the book attempts
to do is understand “science through the prism of the artist, but also to look at art through the
prism of life.” Moreover, Nietzsche finds that the books is quite original in its delineation of
the Dionysian (artistic) and Socratic (critical) ways of being. He states: “The two crucial
innovations of the book are, first, the understanding of the Dionysian phenomenon among the
Greeks: the book gives the first psychology of this phenomenon, it sees it as the single root of the
whole of Greek art. The other innovation is the understanding of Socratism: Socrates,
recognized for the first time as the instrument of Greek disintegration, as a typical decadent.
‘Rationality’ against instinct. ‘Rationality’ at any price as dangerous, as a form of violence that
undermines life!” The Dionysian, additionally for the mature Nietzsche, is not in contradiction
to the Apolline, but to Socratism. He states: “I was the first to see the real opposition: -- the
degenerate instinct that turns against life with subterranean vindictiveness… and a formula of
the highest affirmation born out of fullness, out of overfullness, an unreserved yea-saying even to
suffering, even to guilt, even to everything questionable and strange about existence.”

In his criticisms it is apparent that Nietzsche recognizes how his dual drive thesis is
philosophically problematic as the construction is very similar to Hegelian thesis and anti-thesis
and synthesis. Moreover, this implicit Hegelianism is offensive to the mature Nietzsche. The

27 Ibid, 108
28 “An Attempt at Self-Criticism” Section 4, 6
29 Ibid, Section 2, 5
30 Ecce Homo, “The Birth of Tragedy,” Section 1, 108
31 Ibid, Section 2, 109
critiques also demonstrates the Apolline is not considered an achievement of the treatise, while the Dionysian is taken explicitly as being the single root of the whole of Greek art. As such, the root of all Greek art (lyric, epic, tragedy, dithyramb, etc) is in the Dionysian artistic instinct. Thus, the ultimate duality resides in life-affirming and life-negating drives, in Dionysian unity and fullness of artistic creation and in the Socratic dissection and correction of life. The mature Nietzsche notes that the young Nietzsche’s text (his writing) reflects this opposition. In revealing that he was seduced by Hegelianism and Schopenhauerian philosophy he admits that he was under the spell of a modern form of Socratism. The young Nietzsche writes as a theoretical man who examines at a distance attempting to understand and reveal the underlying logic or truth of the matter investigated. Nietzsche, furthermore, sees that the language conventions he used (philological methods and discourse) do no adequately and consistently convey a major insight about the book: the Dionysian. As such, the young Nietzsche’s style not only betrayed the philosophers’ tradition in which it attempted to follow, but also the very philosophical insights he attempted to convey. Above all, the young Nietzsche is not overcome by a form of intoxication. Rather The Birth of Tragedy is riddled with a contradiction in style and content/message. His argument stands as a refutation of his methods. The young Nietzsche’s message of overflowing artistic creation rooted in nature and in the body is life affirming, but his Socratic, theoretical style or method is life-negating. The young Nietzsche implicitly values the Dionysian, but his methods do not; he affirms and negates in the same breath; he holds no stake in his own instincts and is therefore nihilistic. The creation of the treatise, consequently, does not represent a duality between Apollo and Dionysus, but rather between Dionysus and the Socrates.

In developing the thesis of the problem of science, the young Nietzsche is stuck in a position of difficulty in articulating anti-theoretical perspective because he is using the language
of science. However, what’s important is that the young Nietzsche cannot but reveal his Dionysian tendencies. This is most apparent in the development of his metaphysics of art. Nietzsche states: “Indeed the whole book acknowledges only an artist’s meaning (and hidden meaning) behind all that happens – a ‘god’, if you will, but certainly only an utterly unscrupulous and amoral artist-god who frees (löst) himself from the dire pressure of fullness and overfullness, from suffering the oppositions packed within him, and who wishes to become conscious of his autarchic power and constant delight and desire, whether he is building or destroying, whether acting benignly or malevolently.”

In condensing the meaning of the artist’s understanding of the world, Nietzsche is pointing out that there is not a opposition in drives, but rather a feature of being overcome by the overflowing power of nature. The artist channels these powers and delights their discharge which produces semblances, even if the semblance is destruction. Art them, seems to stem from a singular drive, the Dionysian, which Nietzsche focuses his attention on and further elucidates in his later texts.

In the *Twilight of the Idol’s “Raids of an Untimely Man,”* aphorisms 8-11 Nietzsche also speaks to his metaphysics of art. The aphorisms begin with a one entitled “Towards a psychology of the artist.” Nietzsche claims that: “One physiological precondition is indispensable for there to be art or any sort of aesthetic action or vision: intoxication.”

He further clarifies what he means by intoxication in the context of Apollo and Dionysus. He states: “What do I mean as types of intoxication? Apollinian intoxication stimulates the eye above all, so that it gets the power of vision. Painters, sculptors, epic poets are visionaries *par excellence.* In the Dionysian state on the other hand, the entire system of affects is excited and intensified: so that it discharges all its modes of expression at once, releasing the force of presentation, imitation, transfiguration, transformation, and all types of mimicry and play acting, all at the
same time.” Thus, all artistic creation is rooted in intoxication, however, when it comes to the particular types of creation the intoxication differs in degree to sensitivity toward the unity and oneness with the primordial one. Nietzsche states: “The essential thing is the ease of metamorphosis, the inability not to react.” The Dionysian state then is closer to and creating from a deep connection with nature.

Nietzsche also outlines the possibility of music as an art form. He states: “In order to make music possible as a distinct art form, a number of senses (and the muscular sense in particular) have been disabled (at least relatively, since rhythm always speaks to our muscles to some extent): so that people do not just immediately act out everything they feel. Nevertheless, this is the true Dionysian’s normal (or at any rate, original) state; music is the gradual specialization of this state at the expense of the faculties most closely related to it.” That is, for music to become art, the body of the individual must be disengaged from its consciousness awareness allowing for their self to the channel the overflowing power of nature thereby becoming one with it. For the real Dionysian, she is in a constant state of this unity. Furthermore, in the development of music as an art form it has slowly disengaged the artistic drive that engendered it.

As this brief set of aphorisms indicate, the mature Nietzsche finds that the Apolline and Dionysian are both forms of intoxication. These states share an inherent closeness and unity with the artistic power of nature that provides for their creation of semblances. However, Nietzsche points out that that there is one artist who does “not represent a Dionysian or Apollinian state.” For Nietzsche, the architect signifies a type that is intoxicated by power. Nietzsche states that “for them it is the great act of will, the will that moves mountains, that

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34 Ibid, Section 10, 196-197
35 Ibid, Section 10, 197
36 Ibid, Section 10, 197
37 Ibid, Section 11, 197
Architects are attracted to power and their achievements are in the highest with *great style*: “Power that does not need to prove itself; that scorns to please; that does not answer lightly, that does not notice the presences of witnesses; that is unaware of any objection to itself; that rests fatalistically within *itself*, a law among laws: *this* is how the great style expresses itself.” Thus, the state of the architect differs from the Apolline and Dionysian states in that it is rooted in human power and not in the surplus power of nature.

These aphorisms show that Nietzsche has changed his understanding of the creation of art thereby amending his original dual drive thesis. The metaphor of intoxication connotes the Dionysian drive which seems to indicate that the mature Nietzsche is erring on the side of there being one artistic drive as opposed to two distinct opposing drives. This is highlighted when Nietzsche conceptualizes the Apollinian and Dionysian as forms of intoxication. These are not competing drives, but different type of drugs which produce different feelings and effects. However, the drugs come from the same source. The mature Nietzsche’s thoughts also reveal a revision to young Nietzsche’s claim regarding the three types of artists. Yes, there continues to be three types of artists, but they are not the Apolline, the Dionysian and the synthesis of the two (the Tragedian). Rather they are now, the Apolline, the Dionysian and the Architect. The Apolline and Dionysian creations are rooted in their artistic instinct, but their subsequent productions point to a difference in their propensity to particular forms of intoxication, or rather their drug of choice. Furthermore, this difference is not a matter of kind, but of the degree to which the artist is at one with the primordial one. The architect, finally, is not a synthesis of these forms of intoxication or drives, but differs in kind from the Dionysian and Apolline artists in that the architect’s creation is rooted in will to power and not in the artistic drive.

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38 Ibid, Section 11, 197
39 Ibid, Section 11, 198
I believe that I have demonstrated that the young Nietzsche’s dual drive thesis is internally problematic. Moreover, the mature Nietzsche seems to recognize this as he does not stand by the dual drive thesis of artistic creation. Furthermore, he does not seem to find the Apolline/Dionysian duality all that important. Rather what stands out to him is the Dionysian/Socratic duality. With these thoughts in mind, I believe that Nietzsche’s aesthetic order of rank can be determined. In “The Case of Wagner” Nietzsche states: “All good things are light, everything divine runs along delicate feet’: first principle of my aesthetics.” The mature Nietzsche’s basic principle could be translated to: “that which makes me dance is good.” The mature Nietzsche’s metaphysic of art situates the Dionysian (music) as primary and fundamental aesthetic phenomenon. For Nietzsche, the level of an aesthetic creation’s musicalness determines it place in his aesthetic order of rank. Musicalness describes the degree to which an aesthetic phenomenon is derived from the Dionysiac drive. If the artistic creation is rooted Dionysiac instinct, the art is good--it’s musical. If the creation is rooted in Socratism, it is bad--it’s unmusical. Thus, the mature Nietzsche aesthetic order of rank has resolved the inconsistent dual drive thesis by rooting all art in one drive: the Dionysian.

Works Cited


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40 “The Case of Wagner,” Section 1, 234